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Sustaining knowledge-intensive university spin-off firms in South Africa? 
A small number of South African universities and public research institutes have created 
spin-off companies over the past decade. Such commercialization of knowledge is 
facilitated by a new government policy framework, and a range of government initiatives 
including funding programmes, technology incubators in key sectors identified for 
development, and ‘technology stations’ focused on SMEs at the new technological 
universities. These initiatives, and others, indicate that the South African economy is 
moving towards the policy goal of knowledge intensification.  
 
The research literature suggests that in general, starting or creating a high technology 
company may be possible for university-based academics. However, sustaining and 
growing a successful spin-off company over an extended period of time is a major 
challenge (Franklin et al 2001, Wright et al 2006, Pries and Guild 2007, Mustar et al 
2006). Knowledge intensification requires strong institutional networks to support 
increased knowledge diffusion across national systems of innovation. Despite the 
encouraging trends in South Africa, there is concern that such institutional networks are 
not yet sufficiently developed in the national system of innovation (OECD 2007).  
 
The paper aims to problematise the specific forms these challenges take in the South 
African context. It does so through an empirical analysis of three cases of university-
industry interaction that aimed to create spin-off companies in South Africa. A ‘network 
alignment’ approach to national systems of innovation (von Tunzelman 2007) was 
adopted. The analysis investigated whether and how the degree of network alignment 
within and between the sub-systems of South Africa’s national technological system and 
its industrial system is likely to create the conditions to support competitive knowledge-
intensive spin-off firms over time, to realize national policy goals. 
 
The following two sub-sections describe the ‘network alignment’ framework and the 
methodology employed in the empirical research, before presenting an outline of the 
argument. 
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A ‘network alignment’ framework 
The research was framed in terms of Von Tunzelmann’s (2007) conceptualisation of a 
‘network alignment’ approach, which analyses the interlocking complementarities or 
overarching links that are present or absent within and between networks in production, 
innovation and knowledge systems. The task of network alignment is to assess the 
consistency between multiple and heterogeneous networks, in terms of their ability to 
contribute towards the attainment of the developmental goals defined for a system (see 
also Lee and Von Tunzelmann 2005, Wang and von Tunzelmann 2000, von Tunzelmann 
and Wang 2003). 
 
This model of the national system of innovation places firms and their industrial sectors 
at the fulcrum of analysis (Figure 1). It has imported a model to explain competitive 
advantage, drawing on Porter’s (1990) ‘diamond’, alongside the more typical model of 
the national technological system (the structures and networks of government, education 
systems and public research institutes). The ‘diamond’ represents four attributes that 
shape the environment in which firms compete that may facilitate or constrain 
competitive advantage. These relate to the strategy and structure of the firm itself, the 
factor conditions, the demand conditions, and the related and supporting industries. These 
determinants are mutually reinforcing, and the effect of one attribute is contingent on the 
state of the others. Weakness in any one determinant will constrain the potential for an 
industry to upgrade and gain advantage. Government plays a role in influencing the four 
determinants of the diamond, and can be influenced by each of the four, positively or 
negatively. Government can reinforce underlying determinants of innovation, but it 
cannot create advantage. 





Figure 1. Von Tunzelmann(2007) model of the national system of innovation 
 
Von Tunzelmann (2007) proposes that successful production in a firm is the simultaneous 
outcome of its internal functional structure and their external relationships, its resource 
structure and their external relationships, and the spatial structure of governance modes 
that it fits into (global, national and local). The functional networks intersect in many-to-
many fashion with the resource networks and the spatial networks. That is, empirical 
research needs to observe multiple agents interacting in both functional and resource 
networks in differing spatial contexts.  
 
Thus, the model proposes that for firms, network alignment requires that there are 
complementarities in at least three dimensions: 
1. in the firm’s internal functional networks (linking the four functions of 
technology, production process, products [marketing] and finance - all 
coordinated by management and entrepreneurship) 
2. in the firm’s external resource networks (supply chains/networks of various types, 
relevant to the full range of resource flows, including capital, skilled labour, 
knowledge and technology) 
3. in the firm’s geographical networks ( the local, national and/or global levels at 
which the firm’s activities are coordinated). 
Networks between the national technological system and the industrial system, or within 
the firm and its industrial sector, may be misaligned in a range of ways. Networks may 
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exist, but not sufficiently widely across the system, or they may not function effectively, 
or the networks in one sub-system or function of a firm may have conflicting goals (von 
Tunzelmann 2007). 
 
The case studies presented in Sections One to Three below explore the forms of network 
(mis) alignment that militate against or facilitate competitive university spin-off 
companies in South Africa. The problem in South Africa, it will be demonstrated, relates 
to unevenness and inequalities in interactive capability within and across the national 
technological system, which impact on the depth and extent of network alignment 
possible – and hence, on firm and sectoral progress towards knowledge intensification.  
 
Methodology 
In November 2003, a set of eleven case studies of ‘technology cooperation networks’ 
were conducted, in an attempt to understand their creation, structure and dynamics (Kruss 
2006a, 2006b). Such collaborative, knowledge-intensive interactions between 
universities, firms and public research institutes ‘facilitate the acquisition of product 
design and production technology, enable joint production and process development, and 
permit generic scientific knowledge and research and development to be shared’ (Castells 
1996: 191). 
 
Three cases were selected for longitudinal follow up in August 2007. The cases were in 
the ICT sector broadly defined, focused on innovation of product, and oriented to a 
specialized niche, high technology customer base. The most ‘classic’ ICT case was a 
software development network centred on a virtual reality authoring tool. A second case 
was a bioinformatics network, at the cusp of biotechnology and ICT, to develop tools to 
analyse the human genome. The third case intersected the communications technology 
sub-sector and space science, to develop an imager for a micro-satellite.  
 
For each case, a set of qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with key firm technology and general managers, and university-based researchers. In 
addition, data on each firm and technology cooperation network was collected from web-
based searches and secondary sources. The initial objective was to establish ‘outcomes’ 
four years later - whether the specific goals had been achieved, whether the technology 
cooperation network had been sustained in any way, and whether there had been 
successful commercialisation or the spin-off firm had remained competitive. The second 
objective was to explain this ‘outcome’, using the framework of network alignment. Such 
analysis allows identification of some of the ways in which innovation policy in South 
Africa is appropriate to current conditions. 
 
In 2003, two cases – the bioinformatics and micro-satellite networks - involved university 
research groups in collaboration with small firms that had their origins as spin-off 
companies commercializing previous university research. The prospects for long-term 
mutual benefit were favourable, and the spin-off firm seemed likely to be sustainable and 
competitive. The virtual environment software network was at an earlier research stage, 
and prospects for successful commercialization did not look promising. The range of 
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potential outcomes suggested it would be possible to analyse instances of network 




The 2007 case studies confirmed the negative expectations of the virtual environment 
software network. The project was successfully completed in terms of the research 
group’s academic goals, but it did not result in commercialization, primarily because of 
the lack of interactive capability and the absence of networks between the university and 
the industrial sector, and between the industrial sector and government support agencies. 
 
The genomics case in contrast was extremely successful precisely because of networks 
between the university and the biotechnology sector facilitated by government. But 
contrary to expectations, this success was short-lived, given misalignment between the 
firm and global market conditions, and in the co-ordination of key functional networks 
within the firm itself, that left it vulnerable and unable to achieve competitive advantage 
when capital resource flow networks were disrupted. 
 
The micro-satellite case displayed alignment within the firm, in terms of effective 
coordination of functions, and in terms of the integration of knowledge resource flows 
from the university research group. Here too a degree of misalignment in the networks 
between the firm and a key supporting industry impacted on the networks between the 
firm and the market and exacerbated weaknesses in the home demand, threatening 
turnover and the future viability of the firm. The firm was in strong alignment with 
government strategic priorities. However, fragility in the horizontal networks between 
government departments and between government agencies and the firm meant that it 
was not certain that government or the university would intervene to support the firm and 
ensure its future viability, despite considerable investment of public funds.  
 
Sections One to Three will attempt to explain the challenges faced in each of the cases, in 
support of the analysis presented here in broad outline.  
 
 
SECTION 1. VE TOOLS: MISALIGNMENT AND NETWORK FAILURE 
 
The VE Tools technology cooperation network was at an early stage of research and 
technology development aimed at commercialisation. The network was based at a strong 
well-established historically white research university that adopted a managerial strategy 
of ‘harnessing innovation potential’ (Kruss 2005). It was funded by a government 
programme aimed to promote commercialization, the Innovation Fund (Letseka 2005, 
HSRC 2003). However, in 2003, there were already indications of potential 
misalignment. Once the funded research project was completed in 2004, the research 
products were not commercialized, and the network ceased to function.  
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The case displayed significant network failure, in particular, a lack of interactive 
capability. Key networks did not exist, and as the following sub-sections shall 
demonstrate, there was evidence of conflicting goals that contributed to misalignment. 
 
The network in 2003 
The network was established to produce an authoring tool for virtual environments that 
was user-friendly, versatile and had greater ‘presence’ for the end-user. The key product 
proposed was virtual environment authoring tool software. In addition, a hardware 
platform was being developed, alongside a codified methodology and three model 
scenarios that could demonstrate the potential of the software.  
 
The Innovation Fund mandated consortium initially consisted of a laboratory based at the 
lead university, a strong partner research university, a public science council, two firms, 
and an applications partner, a cultural archive based at the university. Within two years, 
the consortium was depleted, with in effect two active partners based at the lead 
university, and varying degrees of interest from individual agents within the two firms. 
By 2003, there was in effect no technology cooperation network supporting the project. 
The research proceeded under the guidance of the academic project leader and a paid 
project manager, and with a well-paid lead programmer. It primarily operated as a very 
large complex traditional academic research and technology development project within a 
single research group at a single university. 
 
A lack of common goals and network failure 
A strong cause of network failure lies in the lack of congruence between the goals of the 
university researchers and those of the firms involved. Initial interest in the network lay 
with individual managers, and as each firm was subject to a series of ‘buy-outs’ by larger 
companies, these individuals either left or lost their position of authority. Neither of the 
two firms had a substantive financial interest invested in the project, nor was the 
innovation central to their core technology and products, nor were the firms involved in 
the knowledge generation or technology development process in any substantive way. 
Participation in the network was seen as low risk, placing the firms in a preferential 
position to acquire shares in any commercial venture that might evolve out of the 
potentially innovative research.  
 
The absence of an industry partner that had a shared developmental goal and immediate 
demand for the commercial application of the new technology laid the conditions that 
militated against the creation of a spin-off company to commercialise the research 
product. 
 
The reluctance of firms to invest in radical innovation, carrying high risk and uncertainty, 
is directly linked to the nature of the ICT industrial sector, particularly the software sub-
sector, in South Africa (Paterson 2005). The industry tends to import solutions instead of 
developing its own products. Multi-national companies that operate in South Africa tend 
to concentrate R&D in the home base. Small firms tend to be driven by the personal 
interest of the founder, and typically do not have the capital to support university research 
(see Manuel 2007 for further analysis of current trends). In the context of these market 
Paper presented for the VI Globelics Conference, September 22-24 2008, Mexico City 
 
 7 
and factor conditions, there was no meaningful incentive for firms to interact with 
university research groups. 
 
 
Misalignment in the national technological system 
Network failure was at the same time related to misalignment within the national 
technological system. 
 
Strong reputational competition (Whitley 2000, 2003) between the two universities and to 
some extent the science council hindered collaboration in research and development. The 
research functions of each potentially strong consortium partner were not defined in a 
sufficiently complementary manner, creating competition and tension within the team. 
The partner university withdrew at an early stage, and the science council remained only 
formally involved with no active participation. The cultural archive remained involved as 
it had a direct interest in what VE technology could offer, and complementary expertise.  
 
The network was also affected by misalignment in the national university system, in 
terms of the inability to produce and retain a critical mass of future researchers in ICT 
(SAITIS 2000 and 2002). The severity of the software development skills shortage in the 
region (Manuel 2007: 6-7) was a critical factor condition in this industrial sub-sector. ICT 
is an industry subject to the global mobility of staff with scarce high-level skills, and the 
negative effects were felt acutely in the project initially.  
 
Conditions within the university did not promote interactive capability effectively. The 
extent to which knowledge of the university’s innovation policy and incentive or support 
mechanisms had permeated through the institutional systems was uneven. The project 
relied on the academic leader of the consortium, who lacked the tacit knowledge required 
to manage the network, and admitted that it was an overwhelming task, at odds with his 
previous academic experience and roles.  
 
Unsuccessful commercialization by 2007 
By the end of 2004, the research and development project was successfully completed. It 
was technically a success. All the deliverables were successfully produced, and the 
applications were well received. The research was at the stage of proof of concept with an 
executable prototype, but there was not yet a developed product. Hence, the project 
output could not be directly commercialised, and required support for marketing, 
patenting and further research and development to create reliable software. Given the 
absence of a technology cooperation network - in particular, active involvement of the 
firms - when it came time to commercialise the prototype, in effect the process started 
from scratch.  
 
Despite considerable efforts, commercialization did not succeed. The required resource 
flows were not easily available from government or from within the university, 
particularly venture capital, funding for technology development and legal support for 
patenting, nor was it possible to access markets that might have provided private sector 
resources. 




Misalignment of markets 
The project leader was aware that the home market for the software was non-existent, and 
that marketing needed emphasis and expertise, given that the field was globalised and 
dominated by large foreign players, which made it difficult for new entrants (Anon 2004: 
39). Nevertheless, it was argued that the VE Tools products had good export market 
potential. Numerous attempts were made to access markets in Europe and America, 
through strategic partnerships with other firms, but the team could not find a 
complementary partner with the required marketing ability. The early misalignment that 
led to network failure continued to militate against the resource flows that could support 
the formation of a spin-off company. 
 
Misalignment in public ‘technology-push’ programmes 
At the same time, the project leader pursued public funding. There was a gap within the 
Innovation Fund, the government funding programme, as then constituted: that is, there 
was no provision to fund and support the transition from executable prototype to 
developed product. The project leader applied to use unspent funds to bridge the gap, 
which was initially sympathetically received. Bridging funding did not materialize, 
reportedly due to a change in officials managing the funding programme. An academic-
bureaucratic conflict ensued, and descended into an antagonistic personal conflict, 
signalling the end of the relationship between the Innovation Fund and the research 
group. The required resource flows and networks between government and the research 
group did not exist at that point. 
 
Network misalignment within the university as an organisation 
Nor could the project find the required capital resource flows and networks for bridging 
support from within the university. The university’s support for commercialization was 
not as strong as it had been earlier, given a change in senior research management, which 
shifted the direction of organisational focus more towards a ‘laissez faire traditional’ 
position (Kruss 2005). Change in key personnel in the university’s innovation office and 
the absence of venture capital closed one promising avenue. The lack of specialized 
expertise in pursuing ICT patents, together with the high cost involved closed a second 
possibility.  
 
The role of academic agents? 
Finally, it was noted that the project leader displayed weak interactive capability, and was 
not an ‘academic entrepreneur’. After the failure of commercialization, he retreated into 
the typical position of a reputationally competitive academic conducting basic research:  
I am now 55, I am a full professor. A project like VE Tools is too much hassle for 
too little reward. Now I want to pursue what interests me for its own sake. If there 
was a better support structure, I would think of it (Interview, project leader). 
 
This attitude meant that the drive to build networks to pursue commercialization was not 
strong enough to overcome the absence of critical links and complementarities in the 
national innovation and knowledge systems.  
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SECTION 2. GENOMICS INC: MISALIGNMENT OF MARKETS AND THE 
MARKETING FUNCTION 
 
An unexpected rapid demise 
In 2003, Genomics Inc was a successful small spin off company that had been operating 
for 6 years. It grew from a young bioinformatics research and teaching centre based at a 
historically disadvantaged university. The firm had early successes with its 
bioinformatics software, with reports that one of its products was being adopted by 
genomic researchers internationally as a standard for analyzing gene expression states 
(Versweyveld 2003).  
 
The research centre was a textbook example of the benefits of ‘brain circulation’, in that 
it was established by a South African academic returning from an extensive period of 
study and work (including in Silicon Valley) in the United States. The goal was to 
establish an academic base to develop bioinformatics capacity and research infrastructure 
in South Africa. The research centre was integrally involved in national and regional 
government initiated networks to develop biotechnology (see NBN 2006). 
 
In 2004, the firm was pursuing an exit strategy, in the form of a sale to a larger 
international company, a typical goal of biotechnology start-up firms in order to realize 
the initial investment. The firm did not have a large patent portfolio, and needed 
increased funds for marketing. As Von Tunzelmann and Wang (2003) point out, to 
develop producer-led packaged software, initially R&D costs are very high, but then 
marketing costs rise rapidly. Thus, to become competitive in the ICT software sector 
depends in large part on a firm’s marketing strategy, and on the dynamic appropriability 
of up-to-date versions of the firm’s products – which require continuous innovation. 
 
Genomics Inc was negotiating strategic deals with two companies, initially in the form of 
formal marketing collaborations, but with a view to future partnerships. At the same time, 
they were negotiating with two government funding agencies. Yet, by March 2005, the 
firm was forced to retrench all their staff, and in effect close down. By 2007, it remained 
active in name only, as a shell for small scale consulting work by the former CEO. 
 
Network failure in this case can be explained primarily by the absence of home demand, 
which led to misalignment between the marketing, technical development and production 
functional networks within the firm, exacerbated by ineffective coordination of 
management within the firm. The firm was thus vulnerable, and a subsequent disruption 
of its capital and knowledge resource network flows forced it to close down. These 








Paper presented for the VI Globelics Conference, September 22-24 2008, Mexico City 
 
 10
Network alignment in the national technology system  
 
Government policy mechanisms and funding 
The biotechnology sector in South Africa was prioritized for public investment and 
development in the first national foresight studies (DACST 1999). Considerable public 
research funding was earmarked for the sector through a range of direct and indirect 
mechanisms (DACST 2002a, NACI 2006, DST 2007, Campbell 2006a, 2007a, DST and 
eGoli 2004). Such funding created a set of positive conditions in the national technology 
system to facilitate alignment between the goals of government and firms in the sector. 
Early stage funding for biotechnology start-up companies remained limited and high-risk. 
For a number of years, Genomics Inc benefited directly from public and private capital 
resource flows.  
 
The research group and the university 
The university was able to leverage its previously historically disadvantaged position and 
its past oppositional political stance, to attract a commitment from scientists to grow 
research capacity in niche areas, accompanied by relatively high levels of public funds. 
The ‘laissez faire aspirational’ managerial style of this small university facilitated a 
number of bottom-up initiatives that were supported by central management, in that they 
enhanced the reputation of the university (Kruss 2005).  
 
Genomics Inc had an extremely close relationship with the research centre, based on 
personal ties, shared premises and computing equipment, and shared intellectual 
property. Tensions existed, in the need to compromise to balance the value the academics 
involved placed on scientific reputation, publishing and open source software, and the 
values of the company to generate value and register intellectual property. The firm 
claimed that as a result, they were pioneers in new business models and Open Source 
business strategies. The firm received a vote of confidence from a private sector 
biotechnology venture fund, which invested one eighth of its total investment portfolio in 
2003.  
 
Relationships with suppliers were never a problem, as the main resource flow was 
knowledge capital from the research centre. Instead, the firm concentrated on inserting 
their product as an integral part of other supply chains, through global biotechnology 
companies. 
  
Network misalignment: markets and firm coordination 
 
Misalignment between the firm and the local market 
Porter (1990) postulates that the composition of demand, the mix, character and 
sophistication of local needs is key to shape the attention and priorities of firms that will 
equip them to enter global markets. Genomics Inc sold its products to pharmaceutical 
companies, health researchers, and biotechnology firms who required computational 
software to analyse genomic databases. There was no sophisticated home market in South 
Africa for such a specialized niche area. All of the customers were based internationally, 
which had a direct impact on innovation and on the development of new products. The 
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software development was slower, as the programmers were not familiar with the 
demands and requirements of the global market.  It was not possible to send more staff 
more often to meet with international clients, because of high travel costs and the cost in 
time. As a result, the firm had to work smarter in terms of what it chose to develop, in 
order to simply ‘keep up’.  
 
Misalignment in coordinating the four functions of the firm 
In terms of the firm’s internal functional networks, the fact that the primary market for 
the product was at a major distance geographically created significant problems in the 
coordination of marketing with the functions of techniques, production and 
administration. It was a constant battle to retain appropriate marketing and sales staff. A 
‘head office’ was established in the USA, and the sales staff was based there, but this was 
difficult to manage from a distance. The CEO personally participated in the closure of all 
deals, and relied on personal networks. At the same time, there were difficulties 
experienced in finding competent skilled human resources in bioinformatics, a global 
scarcity. Software programmers had to be inducted into the bioinformatics field, which 
created pressures on management. The firm became too thinly ‘stretched’ in terms of 
management expertise.  
 
The fact that the CEO traveled extensively created resentment amongst senior technical 
staff, which iterated with a perceived general mistrust of management. The CEO, an 
American, identified an assumption that management can only operate in a top-down 
manner as a peculiarly South African cultural barrier. Despite a flat organizational 
structure and considerable autonomy, the cultural barrier meant that staff was not able to 
participate effectively in a start-up environment. One instance of lack of coordination of 
the functions of the firm was a constant tension with a senior technical software 
developer. The result was a level of technological mistrust in the CEO’s reputation and 
ability in the market place. The two managers reported that they struggled to find a way 
to manage the firm and create the team environment required. Hence, circumstances 
within the firm militated against the translation of the considerable scientific and 
managerial competence into effective interactive capability. 
 
Misaligned legal frameworks 
The immediate series of events that led to the collapse of Genomics Inc related to a legal 
dispute over intellectual property rights with the senior technical software developer, who 
had left to work at a publicly funded research network. The levels of mistrust within the 
functional networks of the firm left it vulnerable to such exploitation. A poor grasp of 
IPR is a common cause of conflict and disputes between collaborators, resulting in 
misalignment in the knowledge resource flow networks between academic research 
centres and firms in South Africa. A national Intellectual Property Rights framework is 
not well developed, legislation is outdated, and a draft bill to create a new framework for 
the private use of publicly funded research tabled in 2006 has received negative comment 
(Wolson 2003, 2007). Many universities have operated in an ad hoc manner, only 
recently developing internal IPR policies and coherent management strategies.  
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Disruption of capital resource flow networks 
The private sector venture capital company spent a large sum of money on legal fees, in 
an attempt to protect its investment in Genomics Inc. The end result was an out of court 
settlement, mediated by a government department, but the settlement was not in favour of 
the firm. Further public investment did not materialize, and the proposed strategic 
partnership deals with the global firms collapsed. Even attempts to sell the existing 
intellectual property were unsuccessful, given the legal dispute. The firm gave the 
university the intellectual property rights in exchange for its investment, but the private 
sector venture capital firm and the Innovation Fund lost their equity and had no return on 
their investment. As with the VE case, the director of the research centre (who had been 
involved in the spin-off company but did not hold equity or shares), turned his attention 
to strengthen reputational competitiveness and capacity building programmes within the 
university.   
 
SECTION 3. SATELLITES INC: MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE FIRM AND 
SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES  
 
The final case particularly illustrates the complexity of sustaining university spin-off 
companies in high technology sectors in transitional economies. In 2003, the spin-off 
company, Satellites Inc had experienced successful sales of its first micro-satellite, and 
had been voted a top South African SME in a national competition, for a few years in a 
row. It was expected that this case would provide an appropriate instance to analyse the 
alignment that leads to a sustainable and competitive firm.  
 
In 2007 the ultimate outcome remained uncertain. The firm had grown substantially from 
a small to a medium sized company of approximately 90 staff, it had matured 
organizationally and it had developed a wider range of products and services. However, 
in their own words, the firm was experiencing extremely ‘tough’ trading conditions that 
meant it was not turning a profit, and that impacted on its future viability and continued 
existence. The following sub-sections analyse why the situation was so precarious. 
 
Misalignment in supporting industries 
 
The micro-satellite sub-sector 
Satellites have become key to monitoring weather, agriculture, global disasters and 
mapping, amongst many possible applications. Government support is a requirement 
inherent to the nature of the market, and clients are typically government organisations. 
Globally, the micro-satellite sector is highly commercialized and competitive, with the 
advent of private aerospace companies (Alexander 2002). The potential advantages of 
building a sustainable space industry that could lead to high value-added exports from 
South Africa were promoted over the past five years (Anon 2003, Campbell 2005).  The 
space sub-sector in South Africa remained small and highly concentrated, based strongly 
on apartheid defence R&D capability, and firms tended to be inter-linked with one 
another for complementary competences (South African Space Portal). 
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The nature of the micro-satellite sub-sector was by definition uneven and high-risk, given 
that it is a ‘shipyard’ type of enterprise. When it has no new projects, the company has to 
bear all the costs of maintaining a high technology firm, particularly the core of 
specialised engineers. There may be influences or dependencies over which a firm has no 
control, which impact on the signing of new projects. In 2007, Satellites Inc was in one of 
these crisis periods, caught in an impasse beyond its direct control. 
 
 
Misalignment in the networks with suppliers of launch services 
The firm had a sound marketing strategy, with three sequential phases that aimed to build 
on one another. Satellites Inc planned to use the first ‘training and know-how’ market to 
open up the operational market, and in turn, to open up the commercial market. The firm 
needed a track record of producing operational small satellites to build market 
confidence, which was scheduled to be proven by 2004. 
 
However, the firm had a major problem in its supplier value chain, that is, micro-satellite 
launch services. South Africa does not have the capacity and the expertise required to 
launch micro-satellites. The first satellite was launched free by NASA as a secondary 
launch to another paying satellite, as a developmental exercise for the university. Hence, 
the satellite was placed in a non-ideal orbit, which might have contributed to its failure 
after two years in space (Campbell 2005). This was prior to 1994, building on South 
Africa’s long history of involvement in satellite technology and tracking in collaboration 
with international agencies since the 1950s.  
 
By 2007, Russia had cornered the market for launching micro-satellites (Campbell 
2007b). In 2004, Satellites Inc’s first operational satellite was delivered to the Russians to 
be launched, again, as the secondary satellite on a rocket. This launch was delayed for the 
past three years. Thus, the firm organized a dedicated, funded launch as the primary load 
for their next satellite, commissioned by the South African government. Unfortunately, 
this launch too has been delayed, with no specific date set (Anon 2006b, Campbell 
2006b, 2007c).   
 
Satellites Inc had enormous dependence for its marketing strategy in the expanded 
commercial market hinging on a successful launch. The fact that there was no operational 
reference for customers created extremely ‘tough’ business conditions. The delay directly 
caused misalignment between the determinants of competitive advantage for this firm. 
The firm attributed the impasse to ‘geopolitical risk’ over which they had no control, as 
any intervention had to proceed through high-level government channels. Porter may 
refer to this as an instance of ‘chance’, but it is perhaps not as significant as global 
warfare or a crash in world markets. There is misalignment at the global level within the 
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Tough times, but a firm foundation? 
The firm kept afloat by selling knowledge services, in the form of training of future 
satellite engineers. The question was how long it could continue to do so, and how likely 
it was that there would be support interventions, on the part of government or the 
university. The firm was not as vulnerable as Genomics Inc. There was no evidence of 
major misalignment within the functions of the firm itself, and in relation to its industrial 
sector. Satellites Inc was also in stronger alignment with government and the university, 
although there were indications that these networks did not function as effectively as they 
could. Each of these will be examined in turn briefly. 
 
 
Strong network alignment within the firm 
The four functions of production, marketing, techniques and administration operated well 
in alignment with one another, through a networked structure co-ordinated by an 
effective management system. Production and technology development were totally 
interlinked, with no mass production. The firm designed a system and subcontracted out 
parts; but also designed and built most of the components and integrated each piece of the 
electronics, the mechanics and the optics in-house, and then integrated the final product. 
The internal network matrix structure of the firm was adopted from the model of state 
armaments firms in the apartheid era. There was no evidence of an alignment problem 
within the functions of this ‘learning’ firm, which operated internally through network 
modes of governance.  
 
Satellites Inc was also becoming more established as a commercial company run by a 
board of directors. It had taken on a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) partner, a 
consortium of telecommunications, ICT and financial interests, as well as a group of 
engineers employed in the company (Engelbrecht 2007). The partnership was in line with 
government and business attempts to shift the racially unequal ownership structure of the 
South African economy. The BEE partnership venture was critical to the future of the 
company in the current political environment, particularly for the networking credentials 
of a spin-off firm from a historically white and conservative university, in a sector with 
past links to the apartheid defence R&D system. 
 
Less intense alignment with the university 
With maturation of the firm and shifts in ownership, it was evident that the network 
connections between Satellites Inc and the university were not as intense as previously. 
The university remained as a shareholder, but most of the original founders were no 
longer directly involved in the firm’s operations. The knowledge-intensive resource link 
was not as tight, because of budgetary constraints that prevented the firm from funding 
more fundamental research. Nevertheless, the long-established nature of the research 
network and the close financial, knowledge and personal linkages meant that the 
knowledge flows remained available as a key resource for the firm.  
 
The depth of alignment between the firm and government policy and funding? 
Involvement in frontier cutting-edge space science was seen as key to the international 
technological standing of a transitional country like South Africa, and to its leadership 
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position in Africa  (Anon 2006a). Government prioritized space science as a focus area of 
‘big science’, from the time of the national Research and Development Strategy (DST 
2002b: 45). This commitment has been taking more concrete form in the five years since 
(Mangena  2005b, 2006a, DST 2007). The goals of Satellites Inc were in close alignment 
with the goals of government space initiatives, and specific networks existed between the 
firm and government agencies (Mangena 2005a, Alexander 2002:2, Campbell 2006b, 
Mangena 2006b, SAASTA 2006, Campbell 2007c). However, the depth of this alignment 
in practice, and the extent to which networks worked effectively, appeared to be fragile, 
to lack trust and to be easily vulnerable to rupture. 
 
 
The coordinator of the National Working Group on Space Science and Technology 
claimed that ‘the Satellites Inc project was conducted in a policy vacuum’ given the lack 
of a co-ordinating agency, the lack of a single space budget and the lack of government 
support to follow up and build on what had been achieved (Campbell 2005). Although 
the need for consolidating around a single space agency was increasingly recognized 
(Mangena 2005a, Mangena 2006b, Mangena 2007, Naidu 2005), the absence of strategic 
coordination at the time of research was a constraint on Satellites Inc. It was evident that 
the existing networks between the firm and government agencies were fragile, and not 
functioning as effectively as they should. A similar lack of continuity and loss of 
institutional memory in government bureaucracy that impacted on VE Tools came into 
play. Linkages relied on individual agents, and network interaction was not yet 
entrenched sufficiently in the organization and institutions of the state bureaucracy as a 
form of governance.  
 
Government financial and human resources may be spread too thin over too many 
priority areas, to support the firm in its impasse. A senior manager of Satellites Inc 
argued that given the high-risk nature of the sub-sector, and particularly in facing an 
impasse such as the launch crisis, the firm needed government involvement to absorb 
some of the technology risk. Government had no direct investment in Satellites Inc; 
government had invested extensively in direct technology development, but not sufficient 
to maintain business indefinitely; and government was not committed to buy products as 
a ‘preferred customer’. One may debate how much government should invest in a single 
firm (DST 2007: 6). However, the potential risk to the considerable financial and 
scientific investment in Satellites Inc needed to be carefully evaluated as part of a 




In general, the case studies demonstrated that the intellectual capacity to develop cutting 
edge high technology products exists within some South African universities, that there is 
a degree of entrepreneurial and interactive capability that can create spin-off firms, and 
that there is a degree of government funded support for such initiatives. However, the 
empirical analysis showed that despite a favourable policy and funding context, it is 
extremely difficult and complex to sustain a competitive knowledge-intensive university 
spin-off firm in South Africa. The three cases illustrated a continuum of challenges: the 
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VE Tools case illustrated the failure to create a spin-off, Genomics Inc illustrated the 
failure to sustain a spin-off, and Satellites Inc illustrated the challenge to remain 
competitive. In order to explain these outcomes, the paper analysed the ways in which 
functional networks intersect with resource networks in the differing spatial contexts of 
each firm, in relation to its links and complementarities with the national technological 
system, particularly government and the university.  
 
The VE Tools case illustrated misalignment between the software industrial sector and 
the national technology system, and within the national technology system, that shaped 
the failure to proceed to commercialization. A lack of common goals between the 
research group and firms in the ICT software sub-sector, reputational competition 
between research groups based at different universities and science councils, and a lack 
of interactive capability on the part of the project leader meant network failure at an early 
point. The functional networks and human and capital resources flows that could bring 
the macro and micro levels of innovation and production together were not present. 
Numerous attempts to build new links with firms, and to strengthen existing links with 
government funding agencies and within the university thus failed to create conditions to 
support the ongoing R&D required to proceed towards commercialization. 
 
In contrast, conditions of alignment within the national technology system were more 
extensive to support the creation of Genomics Inc and Satellites Inc. However, in these 
cases, inter-locking complementarities in geographical networks (particularly 
coordination of marketing activities on the global level) were absent, exacerbated 
variously by weak interaction in the functional and resource networks of the firm and of 
government.   
 
For Genomics Inc, misalignment of the firm in relation to the national market and global 
demand for bioinformatics, and ineffective coordination of the functional networks 
within the firm itself meant that the company was left vulnerable to disruption of the 
capital resource flow networks it required to put a new business strategy in place.   
 
Satellites Inc had strong internal alignment of its functions and management, and it had 
good knowledge resource flows with the university. However, a major misalignment in 
its supplier value chain impacted on its ability to access global markets, and its 
competitiveness. Its goals were in strong alignment with government’s goals and strategic 
priorities, which meant that government could intervene to support the firm. However, 
there were indications that functional networks within government and resource networks 
between government and the firm may be too fragile to support the firm to enable it to 
weather the ‘tough’ times. 
 
The analysis identified a range of critical points of misalignment, which could inform 
strategic policy prioritization and future interventions – in terms of bridging funds, IPR 
frameworks, supporting access to global markets, and building interactive capability 
within universities and government departments, to highlight but a few options. However, 
it highlights a more fundamental issue that could undermine any future strategic 
interventions. That is, the depth and extent of network alignment within and between the 
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sub-systems of the national technological system and the industrial sub-sectors in South 
Africa is not yet able to support knowledge-intensification adequately. Indeed, the thin 
layer of capacity of key government agents, and a lack of will to provide decisive 
leadership in policy implementation has been identified as one of the binding constraints 
on growth and development in South Africa in general (Presidency 2006: 3-4). Stronger, 
wider and deeper complementarities and overarching linkages within firms, within 
government and within universities, and between government agencies, universities and 
firms, could support the achievement of shared developmental goals more effectively. 
Policy interventions need to build in mechanisms that specifically take into account the 
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